Here are the Australian aviation rego search results for 'VH-TQL'.
The aircraft registration database was last refreshed from the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on
14/Jan/2025
The ATSB has released its investigation report into the
Stall warning device event - Bombardier Inc DHC-8-315, VH-TQL, Sydney Airport, NSW, 1 March 2011
On approach to Sydney Airport, runway 16 left (16L), a QantasLink aircraft’s stickshaker stall warning was activated at about the final approach fix (FAF).
The following findings are made with respect to the stall warning device event: • The stickshaker system activated as a result of the increased reference speed switch being in the ON position, the associated computed reference speed being reached, and the aircraft not being configured in accordance with standard operating procedures.
• A lack of communication and ineffective crew resource management between the flight crew and non-adherence to the operator’s standard operating procedures adversely affected crew actions and coordination.
• Due to time pressure, inadequate crew resource management and the increased workload of both flight crew, the RNAV approach was not flown in accordance with standard operating procedures.
Each factor that contributed to the occurrence resulted from individual actions or was specific to the occurrence. The ATSB is satisfied that none of these safety factors indicate a need for systemic action to change existing risk controls. Nevertheless, the operator undertook a number of safety actions to minimise the risk of a recurrence.
Stall warning device event - Bombardier Inc DHC-8-315, VH-TQL, Sydney Airport, NSW, 1 March 2011
On approach to Sydney Airport, runway 16 left (16L), a QantasLink aircraft’s stickshaker stall warning was activated at about the final approach fix (FAF).
The following findings are made with respect to the stall warning device event:
• The stickshaker system activated as a result of the increased reference speed switch being in the ON position, the associated computed reference speed being reached, and the aircraft not being configured in accordance with standard operating procedures.
• A lack of communication and ineffective crew resource management between the flight crew and non-adherence to the operator’s standard operating procedures adversely affected crew actions and coordination.
• Due to time pressure, inadequate crew resource management and the increased workload of both flight crew, the RNAV approach was not flown in accordance with standard operating procedures.
Each factor that contributed to the occurrence resulted from individual actions or was specific to the occurrence. The ATSB is satisfied that none of these safety factors indicate a need for systemic action to change existing risk controls. Nevertheless, the operator undertook a number of safety actions to minimise the risk of a recurrence.
-----------------------
Dasher was here....